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PLAINS INDIAN AGRARIANISM AND
CLASS CONFLICT

RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH
landless bureaucratic class emerged, and their
competition for political influence has dominated reservation life ever since. As in many
developing countries, modernization was accompanied by a conflict between small-scale
agrarian capitalism and central planning.
If valid, this thesis requires reversing some
well-entrenched historical judgments, i.c., that
the Ceneral Allotment Act was bad because it
reduced the Indians' aggregate landholdings,
and that the Indian New Deal was good
because it stopped allotment and encouraged
Indian self-government. On the contrary,
allotment may have given Indian leaders the
opportunity to reestablish their economic and
political independence from the Bureau of
Indian Affairs-and the New Deal reorganization program crushed this emergent Indian
bourgeoisie and its growing power.

Relatively little has been done to trace the
political structures of American Indians
through the years 1890 to 1940, when reservation economics were undergoing their most
dramatic changes. That failure has left the false
impression of a fifty-vear institutional vacuum.
In fact, the middle years were times of complex
reJisrrihutions of power ;md the emergence of
indigellous socioeconomic classes. It was also
perhaps the earliest period in which Plains
Indians enjoyed anything like an Americanstyle, decentralized elective democracy.
Federal programs shifted the control of the
Indians' food supply. From being skilled hunter-organizers they became recipients of gc)\"ernnwnt patronage, heelme small landholders
and, finally, tribal technocrats. In other words,
they experienced two cycles of centralization.
An agrarian entrepreneurial middle class and a

TRADITIl,l\:AL MERITOCRACY
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Traditional Plains Indian leadership was
earned and evolved through ceremonies of
recognition by family and community.' With
no fixed number of leaders and virtually
universal competition for recognition, good
people were able to rise to influence within

[CI'Q 7 (Spring Il)H7): ill-'ll11

81

84 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SPRING 1987

each family and eventually to win acknowledgement as family representatives in the
nation's councils.' This situation helped to
maintain a certain balance of representation
and power among families and obviated any
lasting concentrations of control. 3 Thus, traditional government could best be described as
an open-ended meritocracy with many gently
competing poles of authority.
Individual freedom was ensured by the
representation of all families in council and by
the requirement of consensus for national
action. Equally important was the nature of
the economy, which rewarded coordination
but did not make it necessary for survival.
Even the smallest family, functioning as a
cooperative economic unit, could provide for
itself under most circumstances. Only in times
of war or disaster were wider economic and
security arrangements unavoidable. Government therefore functioned "at need" rather
than as a permanent, coercive establishment.
Although traditional leaders were not
necessarily more productive as hunters, they
were notable as facilitators of collective action
(Service 1974, 50-51; Clastres 1974, 34; Bernard 1928).4 This enabled them to accumulate
a surplus of goods and obligations that could
be mobilized, through sharing and gifting, to
win support for their plans. In an economy
based on unpredictable resources such as
wildlife, moreover, even skillful producers
faced periodic shortages. Family networks
provided a system of social security against
these unavoidable shortages, and individuals
successful at collecting and reallocating resources inevitably acquired a degree of influence and trust. Effective leadership depended
on knowing how to distribute what had been
produced.
The traditional political system was nonetheless characterized by considerable social
mobility (Goldschmidt 1959, 214). No one
could control the economic factors crucial for
survival. Wildlife was freely available, and
productivity depended chiefly on individual
skill and effort. Thus, while long-term social
security benefited from the existence of family

sharing networks, each individual's economic
contribution to the family system was similar.

THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM

By the 1870s, traditional plains economies
had been shattered by war, relocation, loss of
hunting territories, destruction of game by
railroad contractors, and restrictions on the
movements of "Agency Indians." For at least a
generation, most Indians were entirely dependent on government aid for sustenance. Under
these circumstances, reservation administrators not surprisingly wielded power by controlling the distribution of rations, tools, and
employment. "If you are an agitator, then you
don't get so much; but if you are [an]
undertaker you get more rations every time"
(U.S. Senate 1929, 12378).
Reservation agents themselves were political appointees rather than civil servants until
1907, and they well understood the power of
patronage. Operating under a general policy of
breaking traditional political institutions,
agents identified the most cooperative men in
the community and subsidized their campaigns
for leadership (U.S. Senate 1929, 12442,
12760). "The agent, having control of the food
supply and its distribution, as well as control
over the Indians' personal freedom, held power
with which the chiefs could not compete"
(MacGregor 1946, 35).
Economic and political influence thus
passed from individuals skilled at organizing
Indians to those whom whites trusted to serve
as conduits. Rewarding cooperative Indians
with salaries as chiefs, policemen, judges, and
clerks gave them the financial resources to
build up their own following through philanthropy, competing with and ultimately displacing the influence of the former leaders whose
sources of wealth had disappeared. But while
the superintendent's chiefs enjoyed economic
privileges, they lacked any real power over
reservation affairs. "They do no harm-or
anything else," one contemporary Sioux writer
observed ("Iktomi" 1937, 105).
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The allotment of agricultural lands among
individual Indian households began in the
1850s and was extended to all reservations in
1887. Relative security of legal title created an
opportunity for enterprising individuals to
regain a limited degree of independence from
the ration list (U.S. Senate 1929, 12503,
12512). Farming and ranching also gave ambitious men an opportunity to accumulate
wealth outside the Bureau of Indian Affairs'
patronage system and, through sharing and
gifting, to establish themselves as autonomous
leaders. Many who are viewed today as
"traditional" leaders had their start on the
farm (Mails 1979,68).
Nonetheless, agrarian leaders took advantage of the patronage system until they gained
sufficient independence to compete with the
Indian bureau for power. Allotments could
not be mortgaged, so a successful start depended on government aid to buy cattle or
farm machinery (Trosper 1978; Carlson 1981).
Many also worked for the Indian Service long
enough to finance a family spread, as did a
recent Carlisle graduate who had become a
"successful ranchman" (Friedman 1909, 53):
He has a modern two-story house on a very
large ranch of which he is the owner, and is
the possessor of 100 cattle and 30 horses.
[He] was, for several years, a clerk in the
Indian Service, but abandoned this work
because, as he states, "I have learned that
one can do better and earn more money
using his own resources and working at a
business of his own." He takes a leading role
in the councils of his people.
The first generation of rancher-leaders was
therefore scarcely distinguishable from the old
patronage chiefs, except that they used their
relationship with whites to secure capital
rather than to win permanent employment. In
the process, moreover, they assimilated much
of their patrons' American-style Calvinism,
including contempt for less motivated Indians.

"The time is at hand when every person
should pay his way," the Lodge Pole Indian
Stockmen's Association told satisfied Congressmen. "The days of getting something for
nothing are gone" (U.S. Senate 1934, 296).
It is also significant that one-third of the
young Indians who attended Carlisle Indian
School became farmers and ranchers (Friedman 1912, 282), forming the nucleus of an
educated agrarian bourgeoisie. Agriculture was
not viewed as a hardship, but as a marriage of
traditional values and eo nomic autonomy.
"Cling to your landed estate," Crow rancher
Robert Yellowtail admonished Carlisle's graduating class seventy years ago. "Sell not a foot
of it" (Yellowtail 1913,411). "We gained selfrespect," Frank Fools Crow recalls of this
period, "and were able to maintain much of
our traditional way of1ife" (Mails 1979, 109).5
Characteristic of this agrarian movement
was the appearance of relatively autonomous
Indian ranchers' associations (Grinnell 1915,
176-77; U.S. Senate 1934, 295-97). Many were
cooperatives, pooling land and sharing the
costs of fencing. For example, the Lodge Pole
Indian Stockmen's Association on Montana's
Fort Belknap Reservation fenced nearly thirty
square miles for its fifty-two members in the
1920s. The Association also offered an independent, voluntary political base for challenging the Indian Service and its patronage
leadership by organizing new tribal "business
councils" and running candidates for tribal
and state office. 6
INCIPIENT FEUDALISM

Agrarian prosperity depended not only on
the allottee's skills as a producer and domestic
manager but also on his abilities as an organizer. There were economies of scale to be realized
in ranching and mechanized farming. Larger
cattle spreads required fewer hands per animal
and ran much lower risks of overstocking in
drought years. Larger farms could afford more
machines and keep them in use more of the
time, reducing capital and labor costs per
bushel. Enterprising Indians addressed this by
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pooling neighboring allotments through sales,
leases, and wills. On the Flathead Reservation
in the 1920s, for example, at least 138 of the
370 individual purchasers of Indian allotments
were other Indians (U.S. Senate 1929,
12426-31).
Not all allottees were so fortunate, however. Allotments were small by western American standards, offering little leeway for bad
years or poor management (Leupp 1910,
79-80; U.S. Senate 1929, 12322). Few produced a significant surplus (Meriam 1928,491)
and bank credit was virtually nonexistent.
Allotments could not be taxed or sold until
the allottee had been declared "competent to
manage his own affairs," but in 1917 the
Bureau of Indian Affairs adopted a policy of
forcing competency on allottees as quickly as
possible. Operating difficulties, taxes, and
pressure to sell out to better-capitalized whites
rapidly took their toll. By the 1930s about onethird of the Indians' allotted acreage nationwide had been lost and there were an estimated 150,000 landless Indians (U.S. Senate
1934, 59).
This piecemeal dispossession led to the
emergence of a kind of rural Indian working
class dependent on public relief and migrant
farm labor for its survival (U.S. Senate 1929,
12567, 12578, 12637). The Indian Bureau took
advantage of this state of things to contract
Indians by the truckload as a cheap alternative
to Mexican labor in sugar beet and cotton
fields (U.S. Senate 1929, 12753; Reynolds
1911; Leupp 1910,90, 155-58). Many of these
opportunities disappeared in the 1920s, however, with the widespread use of combines and
other mechanical harvesters (U.S. Senate
1929, 12320). Malnutrition and starvation
threatened growing numbers of Indians, despite the renewal of ration distributions.
At'the same time, this situation contributed to the influence of those who had
succeeded in consolidating their landholdings.
On the Crow Reservation, for example, eighteen families controlled four thousand cattle
and eight thousand horses by 1915, when the
average allottee was fortunate to own fifty

head. Some individual Blackfeet and Flathead
ranchers, including leaders of the stockmen's
associations, owned several thousand head
apiece, and a few Fort Belknap farmers were
tilling five times the average acreage of their
neighbors (Grinnell 1915, 177; U.S. Senate
1929, 12637; U.S. Senate 1934, 297). Landbased dynasties emerged, and for the first time
some Indians found themselves working on
land owned by other Indians (U .S. Senate
1929, 12567, 12578).
Living in some of the least developed
agrarian regions of the country, landless
Indians had little possibility of earning enough
money to reestablish themselves. The unrestricted upward mobility of the old hunting
economy had completely disappeared. Although influence was divided among competing landowners and their family retainers, it
was growing increasingly static and, with
continued consolidation and loss of lands,
more centralized. This tendency distinguished
allotted agriculture from traditional foraging
economies. A successful hunter could leave his
children nothing but his good name, while a
successful Indian rancher could leave them his
estate and thus a head start in acquiring
influence.
THE RANCHING COLLAPSE

Some indication of the economic revolution taking place in Indian country can be
found in Bureau of Indian Affairs statistics for
the decade ending in 1919 (U.S. House 1919,
748-79). Indian cattle production rose fourfold, and crop yields nearly sixfold, while
wages barely doubled and actually fell from 39
to 19 percent of reservation earned income.
Only about half of the Indians earning wages
in 1919 found work outside the Indian Service,
and per capita wages ($136) were lower than
per capita earnings from agriculture ($180).
Indians were working 52 percent of their
allotted acreage and 69 percent of unallotted
reservation lands. Only a quarter of total
Indian income was unearned, i.e., from leasing
or relief.
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The Indians' agrarian prosperity was shortlived, however. While the First World War was
initially a blessing, more than doubling the
price of beef, it also gave non-Indian ranchers
an added incentive to expand onto the reservations. Often in collusion with Bureau of
Indian Affairs employees, a dozen large cattle
companies were able to buy or lease most of
the good Indian grazing land in Montana by
1928 (U.S. Senate 1929, 12314, 12348, 12847).
A common method was called "checkerboarding": the company would acquire alternating
parcels over a large area, frequently by intimidation, and then force the remaining Indian
owners to fence or sell out.
The Indian bureau helped by forcing fee
patents on allottees, subjecting them to taxes
they could not afford, and by charging them
with the costs of reclamation projects from
which they derived no benefit (U.S. Senate
1929, 12316, 12383, 12448, 12464, 12670,
12685, 12747; U.S. Senate 1930). It also
discontinued credit for cattle purchases and
encouraged ranchers to switch to farming,
relocating Indian families from good grazing
lands, which were then leased, to poor farming
lands (U.S. Senate 1929, 12522, 12528, 12551,
12556, 12584, 12601, 12652, 12663, 12751).
The postwar depression and drought finished
off most of the Indian ranchers, and many of
the non-Indians as well (U.S. Senate 1929,
12336).
The Northern Cheyennes received their
first issue of government cattle in 1903. By
1908 they had made their first deliveries to the
Chicago stockyards, and by 1912 were running
over 12,000 head on the reservation (Leupp
1910, 162; U.S. Senate 1929, 12845). In 1915
the Indian Service forcibly consolidated all
herds of individual Cheyennes into a federally
managed "tribal herd," which by the end of
the war was down to 4,200 head. Most
Cheyenne ranchers never recovered. On the
Blackfeet reservation, the number of cattle
owned by Indians fell from 60,000 to 2,000
during the war years (U .S. Senate 1929,
12684). Once again, the effect was to aggravate
income disparities.

TECHNOCRACY

The evolution of a landed Indian middle
class was not only a source of resentment
among the growing ranks of landless Indians
but also an increasing irritant to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. Autonomous ranchers' associations and business councils were viewed as
"rather a nuisance because [they served] as a
forum for agitators" (Meriam 1928, 633). Even
the well-intentioned New Deal reformer, John
Collier, who was forever impressed with what
he thought was the traditional Indian way of
life based on collectivism, could never acknowledge the legitimacy of an Indian middle
class based on the ownership of private
property. When in 1933 he proposed retribalizing reservation lands and restricting the sale
and inheritance of allotments, Indian ranchers
accused him of being a "communist" (U.S.
Senate 1934,365, 3(3).
In the meantime, a growing number of
Indians sought economic security in government employment. This new generation of
Indian bureaucrats-a kind of clerical proletariat-was better educated and more Americanized than the patronage chiefs, and viewed
both the vestigial patronage system and prosperous Indian stockmen as parts of an old
antidemocratic order. John Collier's proposals
offered them a fresh economic start, breaking
the evolving Indian agrarian hegemony and
returning political power, through the local
ballot, to a greater number of the people.
It was increasingly the opinion of white
reformers that the remaining large private
Indian cattle holdings were inequitable and
should be reduced (Meriam 1928, 506). Collier's original proposals emphasized land consolidation, rather than the Indians' right to
form business corporations for economic selfimprovement. To the extent that the promise
of land reform won the support of the dispossessed, Collier exploited an evolving class
division within Indian society itself. Indian
cattlemen naturally viewed all this with alarm.
The new system would "discourage Indian
home and stock improvement" by weakening
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private ownership, representatives of the Navajo, Yakima, and Shoshone tribes told Congress, and would "plac[el in the hands of
irresponsible Indians too much authority and
power" (U.S. Senate 1934,405,408,418).
As Collier's proposed land reforms met
with stiffer Opposltlon on constitutional
grounds, the administration shifted its emphasis to the idea of reservation self-government. i This, however, made little sense to
existing tribal business councils, who viewed it
as an extension of the reservation patronage
system. According to Mary Small, a Southern
Cheyenne banker (U.S. Senate 1934, 366):
Self-government to this extent is already
accomplished through the tribal councils
and tribal business committees, which, by
the way, were organized and functioning
long before Mr. Collier manifested his great
interest in the Indians in general. As you
know, at these councils and business meetings, Indians discuss matters they consider
of vital importance to the tribe and initiate
measures for the better management of
their affairs. But, no action of such councils
or committees may become effective without the approval of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs or Secretary of the Interior.
Where is the advantage of an almost similar
system bearing John Collier's name?
The Indian Reorganization Act nonetheless gave the new Indian tribal councils exactly
those land-reform powers, such as expropriation, that Congress had refused to give
outright to the Indian Service. Since the
councils now operated as satraps of the federal
administrative system, moreover, they also
offered greatly expanded revolving-door employment opportunities for Indian technocrats. This empowerment of Indian
bureaucrats evolved into a new patronage
system based on the reorganized councils'
regulatory monopoly of economic resources,
including local employment and relief payments as well as land and natural resources.
Reorganized councils also used reconsolidated

tribal lands as a source of independent operating income, putting them in direct competition
with allottees for acreage, capital, and markets.
Reorganization may also have had important external political consequences. Not only
did land consolidation reduce the economic
basis for independent Indian political action
but the new internal elective political and
patronage system captured the energies of the
next generation of ambitious young Indians
and distracted them from participating in the
wider political system. At the same time, a
revolving door between the new tribal bureaucracies and the Bureau of Indian Affairs
itself created an enormous supply of relatively
well-paid, secure jobs, distracting young Indians from independent enterprise as well as
from outside private employment.' In net
effect, reorganization helped recapture and
recolonize the Indians' economic and political
efforts.
CONSOLIDATION

"Self-determination," the "new" federal
direction in Indian policy since 1970, has
consolidated the sociopolitical consequences of
reorganization by greatly increasing the role of
the tribal councils as monopoly suppliers of
employment and financial aid, and there has
been no offsetting decentralization of land
ownership. Sixty-five years ago, nearly twothirds of reservation Indians' income was
derived from self-employment and less than
one-tenth from public employment, but by the
1970s these proportions had reversed (Barsh
and Diaz-Knauf 1984). A new class structure
has emerged, with a middle-class managerial
elite and a majority of unemployed who lack
any means of self-sufficiency. Recruitment by
the managerial class remains with families that
seek to preserve dependency-the "federal
trust relationship"-because the election or
employment of dissenters will simply result in
administrative obstructions amd reduced federal aid.
Change may nonetheless result from declining federal financial support for Indian self-
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government. Indian unemployment has risen
sharply since 1980, and current national
budget-balancing proposals threaten to reduce
direct federal aid to Indians by half. Deprived
of federally financed jobs and relief payments,
tribal councils will lose most of their hold over
reservation Indians. Accelerating the development of extractive industries such as mining
or logging, or frustrating landed Indians'
efforts to rebuild some measure of agrarian selfsufficiency, will simply add to the erosion of
their political influence. We may see a return
to the conditions of the 191Os-increased
agrarian and private business enterprise, the
development of independent Indian community associations, and a significant reentry of
reservation Indians into off-reservation politics.
SOME COMPARISONS

What lessons can be learned from this
experience? Perhaps the most important one
concerns the potential for economic and class
antagonisms to energize political change-and
not necessarily for the best, as when the new
options are structures designed by outsiders.
On the contemporary scene, there is growing
antagonism between the tribal technocracyno longer a proletariat but a relatively privileged and entrenched professional elite-and
jobless Indians, who represent today's equivalent of the landless Indians of the 1930s. In
both instances, the motivating force has been
external: federal land allotment policies in the
1930s, government aid reductions today.
It would be useful to compare the socioeconomic histories of Indian reservations in
the Great Plains to those in the Pacific
Northwest, where most Indians remained
fishermen and there was only limited allotment-chiefly of forest lands. There appears to
have been a similar emergence and collapse of
an independent entrepreneurial middle class,
based on family ownership of fishing vessels
and small sawmills. Federal consolidation of
forest management units and the development
of tribal logging and milling monopolies de-

stroyed a number of these family fortunes in
the 1940s and 1950s, and more recently there
have been efforts to tribalize (nationalize)
Indian fishing. The effect, once again, has been
to shift political power from enterprising
Indian families to tribal technocrats.
In many developing countries, agrarian
movements are engaged in similar struggles
with urban technocrats, promoting nationalization and industrialization at the expense of
the self-sufficiency of the countryside. There
are some important differences, of course. In
Asia, much of Latin America, and parts of
Africa, the contemporary agrarian system still
embodies elements of feudalism, and there is as
much of a struggle between agrarian and
industrial capitalism as there is between participatory economic organization and centralization. Yet while the agrarian movements in
these countries tend to place great emphasis on
class unity among peasants, their leadership is
often recruited from the rural middle class of
smaller landowners. When the propertied
middle class evolves into the major threat to
established power, established power tries to
enlist the poor against it.
When we hear it said today that Indians do
not believe in property or in private enterprise,
we are still hearing the echoes of the struggle
against Indian agrarian entrepreneurs in the
1930s-a struggle waged in the name of liberating landless Indians from poverty, but which
in reality returned reservation economies to
government dependence. If the next decade
sees a renewed Indian agrarian movement, it
will inevitably result, at least temporarily, in
renewed tensions between successful families
and other Indians, and in the renewal of old
political antagonism that could once again
defeat the possibility of economic independence and autonomous political participation.
NOTES
1. More detailed models of traditional plains
political systems may be found in Barsh (1986) and
Miller (1955), and a particularly good description of
Crow political life may be found in Voget (1984,
49-54). These models should not be applied uncriti-
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cally to more authoritarian Indian societies, such as
farmers of the irrigated Southwest.
2. "Family" is used here rather loosely, owing to
the great variety of tribal political structures.
Among Lakota, the most appropriate unit of
analysis would be the tiyospme, which served as
both a collective economic unit and as a unit of
political representation and as such remained
largely autonomous.
3. We should not underestimate, however, the
stabilizing role of organizations of women that
underlay the family structure, particularly where
clan membership passed matrilineally.
4. The same general observations should apply
to other foraging societies, to fishermen, and to
horticulturalists lacking centralized industrial infrastructure (such as irrigation) or specialization of
labor.
5. But compare Wissler's (1938, 234) portrait of
a successful Indian rancher who, being neither
Indian nor white, committed suicide out of frustration.
6. Agricultural fairs, originally promoted by the
Indian Service as a means of stimulating individual
competition (Leupp 1910, 159-62), evolved into
today's powwows and became a major theater for
Indian political activity.
7. There was widespread concern that radical
land reform would violate the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition against the taking of private property
without just compensation and thus trigger a new
round of Indian claims litigation against the government. See, generally, the discussion of the New Deal
by Barsh and Henderson (1980).
8. By the 1970s, Indians were a majority of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs' employees, but were
disproportionately concentrated in lower grades
(Barsh 1980).
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